Some Problems for Trinitarian “Essence”

Asserting that the Father, Son, and Spirit are one “essence” is a key component of trinitarian theology. Not withstanding the importance of the term, it is often disputed. In this paper, I will lay out two views of essence in contemporary metaphysics from philosophers Kit Fine, and Michael Gorman. Then, I will demonstrate that, assuming either of these two views are correct, trinitarians will need to alter or abandon their conception of essence. I will have philosopher Joshua Sijuwade’s conciliar model of the trinity stand in for my critique. I will not however, be arguing that Fine or Gorman’s conception of essence is correct. That is beyond the scope of this paper. In other words, I will argue that if we assume Gorman or Fine to be right about essence, that trinitarian usage of the term faces issues that require a substantial pivot.

Fine and Gorman on Essence

There are a few main views when it comes to defining essence. One dominant view is the modal definition of essence. The modal definition holds that an object has a property essentially if it must have that property to exist, or to continue to be the thing that it is. For example, being human is a property that essentially belongs to Socrates. It is necessarily true that if Socrates exists, that he is a human. Fine argues strongly against this modal view. Instead, Fine lays claim to a definitional view of essence, resurrecting Aristotle in the process. For Fine, essence is a “real definition” of a thing. In other words, it is a complete description of all the properties of something. Essence, for Fine, explains exactly what an object is. It is important to note that Fine distinguishes between the nominal definition of a word/term and the real definition of an object. In his account of essence, Fine is not attempting to appeal to a nominal definition of words or terms. For example, Fine would be less interested in describing how we use the word “chair.” Rather, Fine’s real definition would include all of the properties and facts about chairs themselves, instead of tracking the contours of the word “chair.” Nominal definitions seek to fix the usage or meaning of a term. Fine’s real definition, on the other hand, seeks to give a complete description of all the properties of an object, for which we use words to refer to. The real definition of an object is synonymous with its essence.

Similarly, Michael Gorman departs from the modal conception of essence. However, he doesn’t quite align with Fine either. Gorman’s view of essence is distinguished by appealing to explanations. For Gorman, the essence of an object is the component(s) of that object that are not explained by any other characteristic of that object. Gorman gives the example of a hydrogen Atom. It is a fundamental fact about hydrogen atoms that they have one single proton. It is therefore essential to hydrogen that it have one proton. Hydrogen atoms also have the property of bonding with other atoms. This property however, is explained by the more fundamental property of hydrogen having one proton. Therefore, Gorman excludes the property of being disposed to bond with other atoms from being an essential property of hydrogen. Still, it is a necessary feature that, by virtue of the atom’s composition, hydrogen bond with other atoms. So, Gorman creates a classification he calls “necessary accident” for properties that are necessary to the object in question, but not essential. Since the bonding of hydrogen is explained by a more fundamental property of the atom, it cannot be essential. But since it could not have been otherwise that hydrogen bond with other atoms, it is necessary. Hence the term, necessary accident.

Fine and Gorman vs The Trinity

Joshua Sijuwade is one of the leading thinkers in the field of trinitarian theology. He describes his model of the trinity as “conciliar trinitarianism.” (or, more formally known as monarchical trinitarianism) and briefly describes his view as follows “the teaching that there is one God, the Father, and two, relationally distinct, divine persons, the Son and the Spirit, who are homoousious (i.e., of the same substance, nature, and/or essence) with the Father”¹ Sijuwade’s model holds that there is one divine “module trope.” Basically, a single divine abstract object which possess limitless power. This one module trope has three “aspects,” which are closely tied to the relations which the Father, Son, and Spirit share with one another. It is important for Sijuwade’s model that the Father, Son, and Spirit are relationally distinct, meaning that you are capable of distinguishing the “aspects” from one another by examining the relationships which the Father, Son, and Spirit have with one another. Of these three aspects, the Father is the grounding aspect. In other words, the aspect of the Father causes and explains the aspects of the Son and the Spirit. I think it is clear that both Fine and Gorman’s views of essence are not compatible with the kinds of claims that trinitarians want to make about the essence that the Father, Son, and Spirit allegedly share.

First, granting Fine’s “real definition” model, the trinitarian essence runs into immediate problems. Sijuwade’s model holds that the Father and the Son are numerically identical to the divine model trope (hereinafter, divinity). Conversely, if we take A to be the father, B to be the Son, and C to be divinity (or, the singular module trope), we run into major issues in explaining the essence of C and how it can be shared between A and B. The real definition of C is exhaustive of all the properties of C. Or, it is a complete description of every property that C has. However, A has the property of being the grounding cause and explanation, while B has the property of being caused and explained by A. I do not see a way in which the real definition of an object in Fine’s model can be said to include mutually exclusive properties within it. Which is exactly what we have in this case. The Father has properties which the Son and Spirit do not, and the Son and Spirit have properties which the Father does not. There are certain properties of all three persons of the trinity which prevent them from sharing the real definition that would be required to say they have the same essence.

Further, Fine makes a very specific argument against the modal view of essence that directly applies to conciliatory trinitarianism. Fine argues that the fact “Socrates belongs to the singleton set{Socrates}” demonstrates a strong point against the modal view. He emphatically claims that belonging to the singleton set {Socrates}is not a part of Socrates’ essence. The Truth of the sentence “Socrates belongs to {Socrates}” is grounded in the identity of the set, rather than socrates. Similarly, truth of the sentence “The Son is Divine” Is grounded in the identity of the Father, rather than the Son himself. This distinction places certain properties of the Son outside of the boundaries of the essence (or real definition) of the Father. In other words, the complete real definition of all of the properties of the father fails to capture all of the properties of the Son. Therefore, The Father and Son cannot share in the same essence as it relates to Fine’s model.

Gorman’s view of essence is arguably more difficult for trinitarians to account for. Gorman’s reliance on explanations as the essence of an object is directly relevant to Sijuwade’s claim that the Father serves as the ground and explanation for the Son and Spirit. For Gorman, F is essential to x if F is a property of x that is not explained by any other characteristic of x. Under Sijuwade’s model, the son has the property of being grounded by the father. Therefore, the Son and Spirit’s divine properties are a result of the Father being their grounding explanation and cause. The question becomes: are the divine properties of the Son and Spirit explained by something more fundamental? Sijuwade’s answer here, would be yes. The divine properties that the Son and Spirit have are a result of the Father’s grounding relation to them. This means, that the divine attributes or properties of the Son and Spirit are not a part of their essence. Rather, under Gorman’s model, the divine attributes of the Son and Spirit would be necessary accidents, the essence which explains them would only belong to the Father. It is easy to see how this can cause problems for trinitarians. Supposing that the divine attributes of the Son and Spirit are not of the divine essence, but rather are necessary accidents from the divine essence of the Father excludes the Son and Spirit from sharing the divine essence with the Father.

This is by no means an ultimate defeater for trinitarianism. Trinitarians could perhaps argue that Gorman and Fine are both incorrect about essence. This is certainly possible, but it requires attention nonetheless. If the trinitarian wants to claim that the Father Son and Spirit share one essence, they would need to provide a definition of essence that meets their needs while also demonstrating that neither Fine nor Gorman’s conceptions of essence are ultimately false or are inapplicable. Perhaps trinitarians could just accept that the attributes of the Son and Spirit are necessary accidents rather than being part of the divine essence. It could be enough to say that the persons of the trinity share similar powers, knowledge, glory, and love, even if attributes of the Son and Spirit are excluded from the divine essence. However many workarounds the trinitarian has at her disposal, I believe it is clear that contemporary conceptions of essence in metaphysics pose unique problems. At first pass, contemporary non-modal views of essence are entirely incompatible with the way trinitarians want to use the term. The trinitarian must either engage with these views and contend against them, or make adjustments to the way she uses the word “essence” in trinitarian theology.

Bibliography

Fine, Kit. “Essence and Modality.” Philosophical Perspectives 8 (1994): 1–16.

Gorman, Michael. “The Essential and the Accidental.” Ratio 18, no. 3 (2005): 276–89.

Sijuwade, Joshua R. “A Philosophical Argument for Conciliar Trinitarianism.” Journal for Analytic Theology (forthcoming).

Sijuwade, Joshua R. “The Logical Problem of the Trinity: A New Solution.” Religions 13, no. 9 (2022): 809.

Footnotes

1. Joshua R. Sijuwade, “A Philosophical Argument for Conciliar Trinitarianism,” Journal for Analytic Theology (forthcoming), 1. ↩